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I. INTRODUCTION
The Stackelberg model of oligopolistic interaction is one of the workhorse models in
industrial organization. It provides a tractable framework to analyze strategic asym-
metry in which a subset of players have commitment power. In the simplest case of a
duopoly, one player (the Stackelberg leader) makes a choice first, and then the other
player (the Stackelberg follower) moves after observing the leader’s choice. Many
interesting phenomena, such as market entry and R&D races, have been analyzed
through this model of sequential moves.
Motivated by Daughety’s (1990) prediction that total output and welfare are higher
in a Stackelberg market than in the corresponding Cournot market in which players
move simultaneously, Huck et al. (2001) conduct one of the first experimental studies
of the Stackelberg game. While their results confirm the prediction of Daughety
(1990), they also find that, interestingly, the outcome predicted by the conventional
self-interested model (in which each player cares only about her own material payoff)
is rarely observed. Specifically, in one set of their random-matching experiments, in
which anonymous subjects are randomly assigned the roles of leaders and followers
in a Stackelberg game and the design ensures that each pair of players interacts once,
the behavior of the Stackelberg followers is inconsistent with conventional prediction.
Conventional theory predicts that a follower, after observing the leader’s output level,
will react according to a downward-sloping best response function with particular
values of the slope and intercept parameters. However, the followers behave according
to this best response function in only 50.9% of the experiments.1 Moreover, Huck et
1This number, which is not found in Huck et al. (2001), is calculated by us based on the data set
provided by Steffen Huck. Note that the major objective of Huck et al. (2001) is to use experimental
evidence to compare Cournot and Stackelberg quantity-setting duopoly markets. They study the
random-matching and fixed-matching treatments of both markets, and they mainly present the
average level of output of the leaders and the followers. However, we focus on individual behavior
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al. (2001, Table 6) estimate a linear regression model of the followers’ choices, and
find that the estimated parameters are significantly different from the conventional
predictions.
After presenting the experimental evidence, Huck et al. (2001) suggest that the
inequality aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) may be helpful in explaining the
Stackelberg followers’ behavior. Following Fehr and Schmidt (1999), they assume that
some players have non-standard preferences and that a player in this group cares about
the absolute level of her payoff as well as how her payoff compares with her opponent’s.
They then argue that, compared with the inequality aversion model, the conventional
self-interested model is less consistent with the Stackelberg followers’ behavior in
their experiments. In their specification, the null hypothesis of the conventional self-
interested model is tested against an alternative model with a linear best response
function different from that of the self-interested model. However, it is questionable
whether the Fehr-Schmidt model actually delivers a linear best response function. A
related drawback of their procedure is that when the null hypothesis is rejected, it
is not clear how the estimated parameters are related to the underlying behavioral
structure.
We think that conventional econometric methods, when applied appropriately, will
be useful in understanding whether individuals mainly care about their own payoffs
or payoff comparison matters significantly. There are two objectives in this paper:
one methodological and one empirical. Methodologically, our objective is to derive
a testing procedure such that the null hypothesis of the conventional self-interested
model is nested as a special case of an inequality aversion model. Empirically, we
in one set of their experiments–the Stackelberg games with random matching (‘STACKRAND’ in
their notation). We do not use their fixed-matching data set (in which the same pairs of players
interact over several periods), because the theoretical predictions developed in this paper focus on
a situation in which the players interact only once.
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apply the derived test to see which of the above two models is more consistent with
the data. It turns out that the hypothesis of the conventional self-interested model
is rejected, and we further use the estimates of the inequality aversion model to
simplify the theoretical model. We address both of these objectives in the context of
the Stackelberg duopoly game (as in Huck et al., 2001).
To examine these issues, we need to first derive the likelihood function of a sample
of Stackelberg followers’ choices based on the inequality aversion model. We find it
helpful to consider a simplified version of the Fehr-Schmidt model that retains the
model’s essential idea but allows meaningful estimation. In a two-player (Stackelberg
leader and follower) game, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) assume that players with non-
standard preferences have the following utility function:
Ui = Ui (zi, zj) = zi − αimax {zj − zi, 0}− βimax {zi − zj , 0} , (1)
where 0 ≤ βi < 1, βi ≤ αi, i, j = L,F with i 6= j, L is the Stackelberg leader,
F is the Stackelberg follower, zi is player i’s material payoff, αi is her disadvanta-
geous inequality aversion parameter, and βi is her advantageous inequality aversion
parameter. After reviewing previous experimental studies, Fehr and Schmidt (1999,
Table III) focus on cases where the disadvantageous inequality aversion parameter
takes four values: 0 (with 30%), 0.5 (with 30%), 1 (with 30%) and 4 (with 10%), and
the advantageous inequality aversion parameter takes three values: 0 (with 30%),
0.25 (with 30%) and 0.6 (with 40%). Huck et al. (2001) also use these distributions
in their analysis. While Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) conjectured distributions can in
principle be incorporated in the following analysis, we believe it is more interesting to
estimate the parameter values than to impose them. However, because the likelihood
function is highly nonlinear (see Section IV), computational problems are likely to
arise when there are too many parameters to be estimated, especially if the inequality
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aversion parameters of different types of players do not differ much.2
To deal with these econometric issues, our parsimonious version of the Fehr-Schmidt
model follows their assumption that a subset of players are only interested in their
own material payoff, and that the remaining players have the non-standard utility
function given by (1). However, as in Fehr et al. (2007, p. 144), we simplify the
Fehr-Schmidt model by assuming that players with non-standard preferences have
the same disadvantageous inequality aversion parameter and the same advantageous
inequality aversion parameter (αi = a and βi = b for all players with non-standard
preferences).3
To summarize, the simplified Fehr-Schmidt model considered in this paper is given
by (1) and
Pr (αi = a & βi = b) = p; Pr (αi = βi = 0) = 1− p, (2)
where
0 ≤ p < 1, (3)
0 ≤ b < 1, (4)
2Fehr et al. (2007, footnote 17) give a four-type example based on a perfect correlation version
of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Instead of pre-specifying the inequality aversion parameters and the
proportion of each type, as in Fehr et al. (2007), we can generalize this example by letting them be
unknown constants to be estimated. In this case, it is assumed that proportion p1 of the population
have αi = βi = 0, proportion p2 have αi = a1 > 0 and βi = b1 > 0, proportion p3 have αi = a2 > a1
and βi = b2 > b1, and proportion (1− p1 − p2 − p3) have αi = a3 > a2 and βi = b3 = b2. In
this example, there are eight parameters (or nine parameters if we do not follow Fehr et al. (2007)
to assume b3 = b2) to be estimated. The computational problems associated with the maximum
likelihood estimation of this example are likely to be significant, especially because there are also
the restrictions of 0 ≤ βi < 1 and βi ≤ αi.
3Fehr et al. (2007) mention that their analysis would have been very tedious if they had used
the four-type specification of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). As a result, they simplify the Fehr-Schmidt
model and assume that 60% of the individuals have αi = βi = 0, and 40% have αi = 2 and βi = 0.6.
While we also assume two types of individuals in this paper, we allow the parameters to be estimated.
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and
b ≤ a. (5)
Using this model, we first derive the likelihood function of the followers’ behavior.
Using the derived likelihood function and the experimental results with randomly
matched players in Huck et al. (2001),4 we obtain two major empirical findings.
First, the null hypothesis of the self-interested model is clearly rejected against the
alternative model based on inequality aversion, and the null hypothesis of no advan-
tageous inequality aversion is not rejected. Second, we estimate that almost 40%
of the Stackelberg followers have non-standard preferences, and the disadvantageous
inequality aversion parameter is statistically different from zero and economically
significant. These estimates are consistent with the properties of the Fehr-Schmidt
model; moreover, they provide useful guidance if we want to further simplify it.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II we summarize the
behavior of the experimental Stackelberg followers in Huck et al. (2001) that conven-
tional theory fails to explain, and we propose a parsimonious model based on Fehr
and Schmidt (1999). In Section III we derive the followers’ best response functions. In
Section IV we provide estimation and hypothesis testing of the proposed model based
on laboratory evidence in Huck et al. (2001). Section V provides the conclusions.
II. THE BEHAVIOR TO BE EXPLAINED, AND THE PROPOSED
MODEL
In the experimental Stackelberg duopoly with quantity competition considered in
Huck et al. (2001), a player–the Stackelberg leader L–commits her output level
first. Knowing the choice of the leader, the other player–the Stackelberg follower
4Cox et al. (2007, Section 5) also perform statistical analysis with this data set to examine the
importance of reciprocity.
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F–selects her output. The profit (or material payoff) of player i is given by
zi = zi (qi, qj) = (max {d− qi − qj , 0}− g)× qi, (6)
where i, j = L, F with i 6= j, qi is the output level of player i, and d > g ≥ 0. One
interpretation of (6) is that the price of a homogenous product either depends linearly
on the sum of the two players’ outputs or is zero (if the sum of the outputs is too
high), and g is the constant marginal cost. Note that except for the different roles of
the leader and follower, the two players are symmetric with the same material payoff
function.
Each player chooses the output level within a closed interval qi ∈
£
0, d
2
¤
≡
£
q, q
¤
.
Note that within this interval, we have
max {d− qi − qj , 0}− g = h− qi − qj, (7)
where
h = d− g. (8)
If g > 0, then h − qi − qj (and thus, a player’s material payoff) may be positive or
negative.5 In Huck et al. (2001), d = 30 and g = 6.
We first summarize the conventional predictions regarding the above game. Ac-
cording to conventional theory, each player chooses output to maximize her material
payoff, given the behavior of her opponent. The subgame-perfect equilibrium pre-
dicted by conventional theory is as follows. Observing the level of output qL selected
by the leader, the Stackelberg follower chooses qF to maximize zF = (h− qL − qF ) qF .
5We assume q = d2 in this paper, because Huck et al. (2001) use this value in their experiments.
It can be shown that the best response functions of the Stackelberg followers are the same whether
q = d2 or
h
2 , but the derivation would be simpler if we restrict qi ∈
£
0, h2
¤
, because h − qi − qj is
always non-negative in this case. In the Appendix, we discuss how the analysis of the simpler case
(q = h2 ) guides our analysis of the more complicated case (q =
d
2).
6
It is straightforward to show that the best response function of the follower of this
game is given by
qSF (qL) =
h
2
− qL
2
. (9)
We refer to the followers with ‘standard’ preferences as type S followers. The best
response function of type S followers is given in the upper panel of Figure 1. Antici-
pating that a follower will respond according to (9), the leader chooses qL to maximize
zL
¡
qL, q
S
F (qL)
¢
. The optimal choice of the leader is given by h
2
.
While the conventional theory may be useful for predicting behavior in some sit-
uations (such as R&D races in which history dictates who is the leader and who is
the follower), it is inconsistent with the experimental evidence in Huck et al. (2001).
We focus on the anomalies of the followers’ behavior in the Stackelberg duopoly ex-
periments with random matching in their paper. The estimated response function of
the followers is much flatter than predicted, and the slope coefficient is significantly
different from the predicted value of -0.5 given in (9). It is also significantly different
from the predicted value of -0.49 for the discretized game in Huck et al. (2001); see
their footnote 9.
Huck et al. (2001) also discuss the anomalies of the Stackelberg leaders’ behavior.
Conventional theory predicts that the Stackelberg leader would take the first-mover
advantage and set the level of output at the profit-maximizing level (h
2
). However,
the leaders choose that value in less than 27.3% of the 220 trials. The prediction is
even less accurate for experienced players (by looking at the outcomes of Round 9, the
penultimate round), who choose the profit-maximizing level in 13.6% of the trials.6
While it is also interesting to examine whether the Stackelberg leaders’ behavior is
consistent with the Fehr-Schmidt model, in this paper we choose to focus on the be-
havior of the experimental Stackelberg followers. This is because the predicted action
6Huck et al. (2001) mention that they prefer the penultimate round to the last round because of
the possible end-game effects.
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of the Stackelberg leader depends on her expectation of the follower’s type. Thus,
any test about these predictions is a joint test of the underlying theoretical structure
and the assumed expectations formation mechanism.7 However, the predictions of
the followers’ choice (as in Section III) are purely based on the assumed behavioral
model, since the follower has already observed the leader’s action. We believe it is
more fruitful to first focus on clean predictions of the followers’ behavior, which are
based solely on their preferences and not confounded by other auxiliary assumptions.
To explain the anomalies in Huck et al. (2001), we consider a simplified version of
the inequality aversion model in Fehr and Schmidt (1999); see also Bolton (1991) and
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). This model, which has a relative payoff component, is
particularly useful in explaining experimental evidence because the reference groups
and outcomes in this context are reasonably clear. As mentioned in Fehr and Schmidt
(1999, p. 822): ‘The subjects enter the laboratory as equals, they do not know
anything about each other, and they are allocated to different roles in the experiment
at random. Thus, it is natural to assume that the reference group is simply the set
of subjects playing against each other and that the reference point, i.e., the equitable
outcome, is given by the egalitarian outcome.’
In Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Huck et al. (2001, Section 4), agents with non-
standard preferences have the utility function given by (1). They also allow very
general distribution of inequality aversion parameters (Table III of Fehr and Schmidt,
1999).
As mentioned in the Introduction, in order to provide a parsimonious explanation
and to minimize computational problems associated with estimation, we simplify the
Fehr-Schmidt model by assuming that proportion 1− p of the players have standard
preferences as defined by the material payoff function in (6) and the remaining pro-
portion p have non-standard preferences (called type NS players), where all type NS
7This point has also been mentioned in, for example, Charness and Haruvy (2002).
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players have the same disadvantageous inequality aversion parameter (αi = a) and
the same advantageous inequality aversion parameter (βi = b), with the restrictions
(4) and (5).
III. BEST RESPONSE FUNCTIONS OF THE TWO TYPES OF
FOLLOWERS
To examine the followers’ behavior in this model, our first step is to transform (1),
in which player i’s utility level depends on the players’ material payoffs (zi and zj),
into a form in which the utility level depends on the players’ choice variables (qi and
qj). Using (6) and (7), player i’s utility can be expressed in terms of the players’
choice variables as follows:
Vi (qi, qj) = Ui (zi (qi, qj) , zj (qj, qi))
= (h− qi − qj) qi − αimax {(h− qi − qj) (qj − qi) , 0}
−βimax {(h− qi − qj) (qi − qj) , 0} . (10)
In the following analysis, we study the optimal response of a Stackelberg follower,
after observing the leader’s choice. As the two types of followers have different in-
equality aversion parameters, their best response functions are different.
The best response function of type S followers is given by (9), whereas the best
response function of type NS followers is defined by
qNSF (qL) = argmax
qF
VF (qF , qL)
= argmax
qF
[(h− qL − qF ) qF − amax {(h− qL − qF ) (qL − qF ) , 0}
−bmax {(h− qL − qF ) (qF − qL) , 0}] . (11)
The analysis of the best response function of type NS followers is complicated by the
fact that the utility loss due to disadvantageous inequality (resp. advantageous in-
equality) may or may not be relevant, depending on whether or not (h− qL − qF ) (qL − qF )
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is positive (resp. negative). As shown in the Appendix, the form of the best response
function of typeNS followers differs with respect to the level of qL. For convenience in
subsequent analysis, we label the intervals
£
q, eqAB¤, [eqAB, eqBC ], and [eqBC , q] as Interval
A, B, and C, respectively,8 where
eqAB = µ 1− b
3− 2b
¶
h (12)
and eqBC = µ 1 + a
3 + 2a
¶
h. (13)
If a leader chooses a low output level in Interval A, it is shown in the Appendix
that it is not optimal for type NS followers to choose qF in
£
q, qL
¢
. As a result,
disadvantageous inequality aversion is irrelevant for them. It can further be shown
that if qL is in Interval A, then the best response function of type NS followers is
given by
qNSF (qL) =
h
2
− qL
2 (1− b) . (11a)
If a leader chooses a high output level outside Interval A, it can be shown (in the
Appendix) that it is not optimal for a type NS follower to choose qF in the interval
(qL, q]. As a result, advantageous inequality aversion is irrelevant but disadvantageous
inequality aversion becomes potentially relevant. There is a qualitative difference in
the behavior of type NS followers when the leader chooses an output level outside
Interval A. In the Appendix, it is shown that if qL is in Interval B, the best response
function of type NS followers is upward sloping, given by
qNSF (qL) = qL. (11b)
8Note that eqAB in (12) is given by the intersection of (11a) and the 45-degree line (qF = qL),
and eqBC in (13) is given by the intersection of (11c) and the 45-degree line; also see the lower panel
of Figure 1. Note that eqAB belongs to both Intervals A and B, and eqBC belongs to both Intervals
B and C. The overlapping endpoints of the different intervals do not cause problems because the
functions we focus on in subsequent analysis–qNSF (qL) in (11a) to (11c)–turn out to be piecewise
continuous.
10
On the other hand, if qL is in Interval C, the best response function of type NS
followers is downward sloping, given by
qNSF (qL) =
h
2
− qL
2 (1 + a)
. (11c)
The intuition of the difference in (11b) and (11c) is as follows. When advantageous
inequality aversion is irrelevant, there are two components in a type NS follower’s
utility level according to (10)–she wants to maximize the first term (material payoff)
but to minimize the second term (utility loss from disadvantageous inequality). To
maximize the material payoff, the best response of the follower is given by (9). In
Interval B, whether the follower uses (9) or (11b), the difference in material payoff is
relatively minor (since the material payoff function is quite flat around the optimal
choice) but the difference in the utility loss from inequality aversion is more important.
Therefore, the choice of a type NS follower that minimizes the utility loss due to
disadvantageous inequality also maximizes (10), and the follower chooses (11b). In
Interval C, the reduction in material payoff if the follower uses (11b) is relatively large.
As a result, minimizing the utility loss due to inequality aversion cannot compensate
for the loss in the material payoff, and it is optimal for the follower to compromise
between these two terms and choose according to (11c).
The best response function of a typeNS follower is represented in the lower panel of
Figure 1. There are a number of interesting features. First, this function is continuous
but is piecewise linear instead of smooth throughout the interval
£
q, q
¤
. Second, the
best response function of a type NS follower is upward sloping in Interval B (with a
slope of 1) but is downward sloping in Interval C (and is less steep than in Interval
A). Third, the best response function of type S followers is just a special case of that
of type NS followers, when both parameters a and b approach 0.
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IV. MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION AND TESTING
The theoretical analysis of the simplified Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model in Section
III shows that the best response function of Stackelberg followers with non-standard
preferences is piecewise linear, with the intervals determined endogenously by the
inequality aversion parameters. On the other hand, the best response function of the
Stackelberg followers with standard preferences is linear. We now provide statistical
analysis of this model.
The likelihood function of a sample of Stackelberg followers’ choices
We first derive the likelihood function of the followers’ choices conditional on the
leaders’ actions in a sample of n independent experimental trials. In the statistical
model, we interpret that the theoretical predictions of the simplified Fehr-Schmidt
model in Section III form the systematic part of the followers’ behavior, and we in-
troduce a random error term to capture other unspecified influences on their behavior.
To simplify the notation in the following analysis, we use x and y to stand for qL
and qF , respectively. Let xi and yi represent, respectively, the leader’s and follower’s
choices for the i-th (i = 1, ..., n) observation. If the follower in the i-th trial has
standard preferences, then
yi = q
S
F (xi) + εi, (14)
where the best response function qSF (.) is given by (9) and the random error εi is
assumed to be independently and identically distributed according to a normal dis-
tribution N (0,σ2). Alternately, if the follower in the i-th trial has non-standard
preferences, then
yi = q
NS
F (xi) + εi, (15)
where the best response function qNSF (.) is given by (11a) to (11c), depending on the
value of the leader’s choice xi.
12
According to the simplified Fehr-Schmidt model, the population of Stackelberg
followers consists of proportion 1− p of players with standard preferences, and pro-
portion p of players with non-standard preferences. Thus, from an econometrician’s
perspective, the probability density of observing yi (conditional on xi and parameters
a, b, p and σ) is given by
(1− p)× fS (yi|xi; σ) + p× fNS (yi|xi; a, b,σ) , (16)
where fS (yi|xi; σ) is the probability density of observing yi when the follower has
standard preferences, and fNS (yi|xi; a, b, σ) is the probability density of observing yi
when the follower has non-standard preferences.
In the analysis below, we simplify fS (yi|xi;σ) as fS (yi) and fNS (yi|xi; a, b,σ) as
fNS (yi). From (14), (15), (9) and (11a) to (11c), we obtain
fS (yi) =
1√
2πσ2
exp
"
−
¡
yi − h2 +
xi
2
¢2
2σ2
#
, (17)
and
fNS (yi) = fA (yi)
1−DB(xi)−DC(xi) × fB (yi)DB(xi) × fC (yi)DC(xi) , (18)
where
fA (yi) =
1√
2πσ2
exp
⎡
⎢⎣
−
³
yi − h2 +
xi
2(1−b)
´2
2σ2
⎤
⎥⎦ , (18a)
fB (yi) =
1√
2πσ2
exp
"
− (yi − xi)2
2σ2
#
, (18b)
fC (yi) =
1√
2πσ2
exp
⎡
⎢⎣
−
³
yi − h2 +
xi
2(1+a)
´2
2σ2
⎤
⎥⎦ , (18c)
and the two indicator variables are given by
DB (xi) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 if
¡
1−b
3−2b
¢
h < xi ≤
¡
1+a
3+2a
¢
h
0 otherwise
, (18d)
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and
DC (xi) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 if
¡
1+a
3+2a
¢
h < xi
0 otherwise
. (18e)
Therefore, the (log) likelihood function of observing a sample of n independent Stack-
elberg experiments is given by:
lnL (a, b, p, σ; (x1, y1) , ..., (xn, yn))
=
nX
i=1
ln
n
(1− p) fS (yi) + p
h
fA (yi)
1−DB(xi)−DC(xi) fB (yi)
DB(xi) fC (yi)
DC(xi)
io
.
(19)
The maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the simplified Fehr-Schmidt
model are obtained by maximizing the log likelihood function (19), and the standard
errors are obtained from the Hessian matrix. Even though (19) is highly nonlinear,
the estimates can be obtained by standard optimization procedures. Applying the
maximum likelihood estimation method to the random-matching Stackelberg exper-
iments of Huck et al. (2001) with h = 24,9 we obtain the results in Table 1.10 The
maximum likelihood estimates of p, a and b are 0.388, 5.231 and 0.156, respectively.
9There are two caveats in applying the likelihood function (19) to the Huck et al. (2001) data.
First, this likelihood function is derived for the material payoff functions given by (6), but the payoff
structure in Huck et al.’s (2001) experiments has been modified slightly to assure uniqueness of the
equilibrium; see p. 753 of their paper. Second, the derivation of (19) is based on n independent
trials (n = 220 in Table 1). However, the random-matching Stackelberg experiment data set in Huck
et al. (2001) consists of 22 pairs of players, each with 10 trials. If we had the coding of individual
subjects, it might be better to assume that the same follower would use either (14) or (15) in all
10 trials. Unfortunately, such detailed information for this data set has been discarded (private
communication). The best we can do in this situation is to use (19), and this can still be justified if
we make the perhaps more controversial assumption that a follower may use (15) with probability
p and (14) with probability 1− p in different trials.
10Note that restrictions (3) to (5) are not imposed in the estimation. The validity of these
restrictions will be examined, as discussed in the next paragraph.
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The estimated best response function of type NS followers is represented by the
piecewise linear function ABDE in Figure 2, whereas the best response function of
type S followers is given by the straight line ACF. Among the 108 followers whose
choice variables are not on the best response function of type S followers, 92 (85.1%)
are above this line and 16 (14.8%) are below it.
Before providing interpretation of the estimated coefficients, in the next sub-section
we will examine restrictions (4) and (5) on the inequality aversion parameters of the
simplified Fehr-Schmidt model, under the maintained assumption that some players
have non-standard preferences (i.e., 0 < p < 1). We will then test the null hypothesis
of the self-interested model (i.e., p = 0) against the alternative hypothesis of the
simplified Fehr-Schmidt model.
Testing the restrictions on the inequality aversion parameters
It can be concluded from Table 1 that the restrictions (4) and (5) suggested by
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) are not violated.11 We focus our analysis in this sub-section
to see whether or not these restrictions can be further simplified.
To examine whether the disadvantageous inequality aversion parameter is equal
to or strictly larger than the advantageous inequality aversion parameter, we use a
one-sided t-test to test the null hypothesis H0 : a − b = 0 against the alternative
hypothesis H1 : a− b > 0. We construct the usual test statistic t = ba−bbse(ba−bb) , where ba
and bb are, respectively, the maximum likelihood estimate of a and b, and se³ba−bb´
is the standard error of ba−bb. Under the null hypothesis a− b = 0, this test statistic
has a standard normal distribution asymptotically. Based on the estimation results
in Table 1, the value of the t-statistic is calculated to be t = 3.84 and thus the null
11For example, to test the null hypothesis H0 : b = 1 against the alternative hypothesis H1 : b > 1,
the t-statistic is given by t = bb−1
se(bb) = −7.40. Therefore, the null hypothesis is not rejected.
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hypothesis a− b = 0 is rejected at, say, a 5% significance level.
To examine whether the advantageous inequality aversion parameter is equal to or
strictly larger than 0, we test H0 : b = 0 against H1 : b > 0. The value of the t-
statistic is given by t = 1.37. Thus, the null hypothesis that advantageous inequality
aversion is unimportant (b = 0) cannot be rejected at a 5% significance level.
In the following analysis we further simplify the Fehr-Schmidt model by using the
restriction
b = 0, (4a)
instead of (4). Following the same steps as above, it can be shown that the log
likelihood function corresponding to the simplified Fehr-Schmidt model with no ad-
vantageous inequality aversion is given by
lnL =
nX
i=1
ln
n
(1− p) fS (yi) + p
h
fS (yi)
1−DB(xi)−DC(xi) fB (yi)
DB(xi) fC (yi)
DC(xi)
io
,
(20)
where
DB (xi) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 if h
3
< xi ≤
¡
1+a
3+2a
¢
h
0 otherwise
, (20a)
and fS (yi), fB (yi), fC (yi) and DC (xi) are the same as before. Note that when b = 0,
(18a) becomes (17) and (18d) becomes (20a).
The maximum likelihood estimates of this model are given in Table 1. It is observed
that the estimated values of p and a are very close to those of the previous model.
The estimated best response function of type NS followers (with no advantageous
inequality aversion) is represented by the piecewise linear function ACDE in Figure
2.
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Testing the self-interested model against the simplified Fehr-Schmidt model
Huck et al. (2001) examine the conventional self-interested model by using a linear
regression model of the followers’ choices. In their Table 6, the null hypothesis of
the self-interested model with a linear best response function is tested against an
alternative model with another linear best response function (i.e., the parameters
are different from those of the self-interested model). However, it is not clear what
behavioral model corresponds to their alternative hypothesis.
Guided by the theoretical analysis in Section III, we believe that a better way to
examine the validity of the self-interested model is to use the simplified Fehr-Schmidt
model (instead of an unspecified model with a linear best response function) to nest
the self-interested model.
To test the null hypothesis of the self-interested model against the alternative hy-
pothesis of the simplified Fehr-Schmidt model, we obtain the likelihood function under
the null hypothesis as
lnL (σ; (x1, y1) , ..., (xn, yn)) =
nX
i=1
ln [fS (yi)] , (21)
where fS (yi) is given by (17). The maximum likelihood estimates of this model for
the Huck et al. (2001) data are given in Table 1.
To test the null hypothesis of the self-interested model against the simplified Fehr-
Schmidt model, we construct the likelihood ratio test statistic
LR = 2 (lnLu − lnLr) , (22)
where the unrestricted log likelihood lnLu is given by (20) and the restricted log
likelihood lnLr is given by (21). Under the null hypothesis, the test statistic of (22)
has a χ2-distribution of 2 degrees of freedom. Based on the estimation results in
Table 1, LR = 184.88. Therefore, the null hypothesis is strongly rejected.12
12The same conclusion is obtained if lnLu is calculated according to (19) when advantageous
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Summary
To summarize, the self-interested model is decisively rejected against the simpli-
fied Fehr-Schmidt model, using the Huck et al. (2001) experimental data. Moreover,
the estimates of both p and a are significantly different from zero. According to the
estimation results of the simplified Fehr-Schmidt model in Table 1, there is a repre-
sentative group of followers (39%) with non-standard preferences, and the estimated
disadvantageous inequality aversion parameter is very high (at a value of 5.2). These
conclusions are robust whether advantageous inequality aversion is included in the
model or not.
Our empirical results are generally consistent with those in previous studies, but
there are also new findings. First, the estimation results in Table 1 are consistent with
the experimental evidence in Messick and Sentis (1985) and Loewenstein et al. (1989)
that the subjects exhibit a significantly weaker aversion to advantageous inequality
than to the aversion to disadvantageous inequality. Second, Goeree and Holt (2000)
use the maximum likelihood estimation method to study inequality aversion in ex-
perimental alternating-offer bargaining games. They assume that all proposers have
the same utility parameters, as do the responders. According to their findings, the
disadvantageous inequality aversion estimate is 0.84, and the advantageous inequality
aversion estimate is 0.66 for the proposers and 0.12 for the responders. Since they do
not assume that a proportion of players have the standard self-interested preferences,
the comparison with our estimation results is not direct. Nevertheless, it appears
reasonable to conclude that, when compared with their results, our disadvantageous
inequality aversion estimate is higher and advantageous inequality aversion estimate
is lower. Overall, the empirical evidence on inequality aversion based on the Huck
et al. (2001) data set is qualitatively similar to previous studies, but our results of
inequality aversion is included.
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higher disadvantageous inequality aversion estimate and lower (and insignificant) ad-
vantageous inequality aversion estimate also reveal some quantitative disagreement
with previous studies. Further research will be required to sort out the differences
regarding the ranges of inequality aversion parameters found in various studies.
V. CONCLUSION
In nearly half of the random-matching Stackelberg duopoly experiments in Huck
et al. (2001), the followers do not behave as predicted by the conventional theory.
Their behavior raises the questions of why the conventional theory fails by such an
extent, and necessitates a better explanation.
In the Stackelberg duopoly experiments (as well as many other game-theoretic
situations), testing the predictions of conventional theory is really a matter of testing
the joint hypothesis of the players’ (sometimes rather complicated) strategic behavior
and the standard self-interested preferences. In the current case, the structure of the
game is very simple (especially for the followers), and it is reasonable to assume that
the players are intelligent enough to understand the game and behave strategically.
As a result, it is natural to seek explanations based on non-standard preferences.
While there are well-known models of social preferences in the literature, there are
also critics of this approach who worry that altering the unobservable utility function
would allow one to explain any phenomenon. In his book on behavioral economics,
Camerer (2003, p. 101) defends the study of social preferences convincingly: ‘The
goal is not to explain every different finding by adjusting the utility function just so;
the goal is to find parsimonious utility functions, supported by psychological intuition,
that are general enough to explain many phenomena in one fell swoop, and also make
new predictions.’
In this paper, we follow this idea and consider a parsimonious model of social pref-
erences that nests the standard preferences as a special case to explain experimental
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Stackelberg duopoly. Our paper makes methodological and substantive contributions.
Methodologically, using the study of inequality aversion in the Stackelberg game, we
illustrate that existing econometric methods can be applied to test a conventional
self-interested model against a relatively new model of social preferences. We show
that the best response function of the Stackelberg followers with non-standard pref-
erences is piecewise linear, with the intervals depending on the inequality aversion
parameters. Moreover, the results about the theoretical model lead naturally to a
maximum likelihood framework for statistical analysis. Through careful econometric
analyses, our paper also makes substantive contributions by showing that the conven-
tional self-interested model is rejected decisively against the alternative hypothesis of
the simplified Fehr-Schmidt model, and that a significant proportion (close to 40%)
of the players are significantly averse to disadvantageous inequality. Given that the
behavior of a high proportion of individuals in the experiments conducted by Huck et
al. (2001) is inconsistent with the conventional self-interested model, one should not
apply this model indiscriminately, but rather consider whether other factors (such as
inequality aversion) may be useful in specific contexts. Furthermore, our estimates
of the magnitude of inequality aversion parameters provide support for the use of a
more parsimonious model with no advantageous inequality aversion in future applied
work.
Finally, we should point out that, while we take the Fehr-Schmidt model seriously
and apply a rigorous statistical framework to examine whether its implications are
consistent with the data, inequality aversion is not necessarily the only theory that
may explain the Huck et al. (2001) data set. In recent contributions to the litera-
ture on fairness, Charness and Haruvy (2002), Falk and Fischbacher (2006) and Falk
et al. (2008) suggest that both the intention-oriented theory of reciprocity (such as
Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004) and the outcome-oriented theory
of inequality aversion (such as Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000)
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may be relevant. In the context of experimental Stackelberg games, a possible way to
discriminate between intention-oriented and outcome-oriented preferences is to con-
sider two games: one which allows the leaders to choose (as in Huck et al., 2001) while
the other generates the leaders’ actions randomly. It is likely that the results of this
paper, such as the best response functions of different types of Stackelberg followers
and the associated likelihood function, will be useful in studies further examining
these types of questions. More generally, we find that there is reason to believe that
systematic application of econometric techniques to the study of social preferences
can deepen our understanding of human behavior and motivation.
APPENDIX
Derivation of the best response function of type NS followers.13 As the
utility level of a type NS player depends on whether zF is larger or smaller than
zL, we analyze these two cases separately (for each of the three intervals). Note that
when either (i) h − qL − qF > 0 and qF < qL (i.e., area ODEG in Figure 1) or (ii)
h − qL − qF < 0 and qF > qL (i.e., area FGH in Figure 1), we have zF < zL and
therefore,
UF = zF − a (zL − zF ) = (h− qL − qF ) [(1 + a) qF − aqL] . (A1)
On the other hand, when either (i) h − qL − qF < 0 and qF < qL (i.e., area EFG in
Figure 1) or (ii) h− qL − qF > 0 and qF > qL (i.e., area OGHI in Figure 1), we have
UF = zF − b (zF − zL) = (h− qL − qF ) [(1− b) qF + bqL] . (A2)
Consider Interval A when qL ∈
£
q, eqAB¤. Using (A1), we show that for any qL in
Interval A, UF is increasing in qF for qF ∈
£
q, qL
¤
. Using (A2), we show that for any qL
in Interval A, UF is first increasing in qF for qF ∈
h
qL,
h
2
− qL
2(1−b)
i
and then decreasing
13In the following analysis we make use of well-known properties of quadratic functions.
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in qF for qF ∈
h
h
2
− qL
2(1−b) , q
i
. Thus, the best response of a type NS follower to qL in
Interval A is given by (11a).
Consider Interval B when qL ∈ [eqAB, eqBC ]. Using (A1), we show that for any qL in
Interval B, UF is increasing in qF for qF ∈
£
q, qL
¤
. It can also be shown that for any
qL in Interval B, UF is decreasing in qF for qF ∈ [qL, q].14 Thus, the best response of
a type NS follower to qL in Interval B is given by (11b).
Consider Interval C when qL ∈ [eqBC , q]. It can be shown that for any qL in Interval
C, UF is increasing in qF for qF ∈
h
q, h
2
− qL
2(1+a)
i
, and decreasing in qF for qF ∈h
h
2
− qL
2(1+a)
, q
i
.15 Thus, the best response of a type NS follower to qL in Interval C
is given by (11c).
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Figure 1. Best response functions of type S and type NS followers 
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Figure 2. Estimated best response functions
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Data count: 1
Data count: 2−5
Data count: 6−8
Data count: 15, 16, 21, 27
 TABLE 1 
Estimation results 
 
 
Simplified 
Fehr-Schmidt 
model 
Simplified Fehr-
Schmidt model with no 
advantageous 
inequality aversion 
Self-interested 
model 
p  0.388 
(0.0427) 
0.386 
(0.0427) - 
a  5.231 (1.316) 
5.231 
(1.323) - 
b  0.156 (0.114) - - 
σ  1.158 (0.0617) 
1.164 
(0.0619) 
2.591 
(0.124) 
Estimate of cov ,a b
∧ ∧⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  0.000503 - - 
ln L -428.52 -429.14 -521.58 
 
Notes: For each of parameters p , , b  and a σ , the number not in parentheses is the 
maximum likelihood estimate and the number in parentheses is the standard error. Note that 
the sample size ( ) is 220 and  in Huck et al. (2001). n 24h =
 
 
 
 
  
